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NOTES
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYEE
FRINGE BENEFITS
While it is clearly unlawful to pay men and women unequal wages
for equal work,' or to exclude women from any job solely on the
basis of sex (except in the limited circumstance where sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification),2 the law concerning sex discrimination
in the more subtle form of unequal employee fringe benefits is less
clear. As the use of fringe benefits as compensation has increased dra-
matically in recent years3 to the point where fringe benefits now con-
stitute an average of 25 percent of the cost to employers of all pay-
rolls, 4 the significance of discrimination in their conferral has increased
correspondingly. Although the effort to eliminate sex discrimination in
hiring and wages is still of primary importance,5 Congress," the courts,'
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1970). See
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1975) for an interpretation of bona fide occupational qualification.
2. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
3. Foust, The Total Approach Concept, in THE TOTAL APPROACH TO EMPLOYER BENE-
FITS 10 (A. Deric ed. 1967). The author notes that the growth of fringe benefits was
spurred in World War II by the Stabilization Act of 1942, which essentially froze all
wages and salaries while permitting reasonable increases in employee benefits. Id.
4. Id. at 26. The increase in the use of fringe benefits has been stimulated by the
nation's tax laws which allow exclusion of employer payments to retirement, health,
and accident programs from the taxable income of the employee, despite their clear
nature as compensation. For example, section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides that an individual's gross income does not include contributions by the employer
to accident and health plans which compensate employees' personal injuries and sick-
ness. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 106.
5. Employment statistics and earnings figures not only reflect the effects of past and
present discrimination against women but also reflect the failure of current prohibitions
against discrimination. As of 1970, women were three times more likely than men to
earn less than $5,000 for year round, full-time work. The difference between median
earnings of full-time male and female employees remained at 58 percent from 1966
through 1968, a more than $3,000 differential per individual. Though the number of
women in professional and technical fields has increased, the proportions of women in
those fields dropped from 45 percent in 1940 to 37 percent in 1969. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, WO.MEN'S BUREAU, UNDERUTILIZATION OF V'o.IEN" WORKERS 1-9 (1971).
More recent Department of Labor statistics cited by the Supreme Court in Kahn v.
Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734, 1736 (1974), indicate that the above figures have changed sub-
stantiallv. See note 78 hifra & accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829.
7. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 94 S. Cr. 2485 (1974); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual
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and several administrative agencies8 recently have demonstrated concern
for discriminatory conferral of fringe benefits. The case law confront-
ing this issue, however, has demonstrated that the standards and remedies
under various federal laws, notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,9 the Equal Pay Act of 1963,10 Executive Order 11246," and
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,'12 are
fragmented, confusing, and sometimes contradictory. Prerequisites to
the reduction or elimination of discrimination in employee benefits are
a precise definition of equality of treatment and a uniform federal policy
to implement existing laws. The initial step toward this goal must be
an examination of the present legal standards proscribing sex discrimi-
nation.
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW:
THE CONFLICT OF DIFFERING STANDARDS
An examination of the various statutory sources of federal law pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of sex reveals several different and
conflicting standards.
Title VII
As amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,'13
Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3624 (U.S. May
27, 1975).
8. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 71-1474, CCH EEOC DEcisioNs (1973) $1 6221 (Mar.
19, 1971); Wage and Hour Opinion Letter No. 484, CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE § 1208.315
(Aug. 3, 1966).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
11. 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1975).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h-2 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to
2000h-6 (1970).
The 1972 amendment significantly enlarged the coverage of Title VII by including
employers with 15 or more employees rather than employers with 25 or more as required
by the original Act. The law now reads: "The term 'employer' means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972). Employees of the federal govern-
ment and the District of Columbia were extended protection from discriminatory action
by the 1972 amendment, but the Civil Service Commission, rather than the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, was granted enforcement powers. Id. S 2000e-16(b).
The separate treatment accorded these employees has been atttributed to a vigorous
effort on the part of the Civil Service Commission to prevent losing its jurisdiction in
these areas to the EEOC. See Mitchell, An Advocate's View of the 1972 Amendments
to Title VII, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. Rv. 311, 318 (1973).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 with some exceptions,'5
prohibits discrimination by employers, 16 employment agencies, and
labor unions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin'
and covers a broad spectrum of employment practices.' 8
Under section 703 (a) (1), discrimination "against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment. .. " is an unlawful employment practice,9 and it is clear that the
terms "compensation" and "privileges of employment" encompass em-
ployee benefit plans. 20
Among the various remedies afforded by Title VII against sex dis-
crimination is the provision in section 706(g),21 allowing injunctive
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h-6 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h-2
(Supp. II, 1972).
15. The Act permits discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin
(but not race or color) where the religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification. Id. § 2000e-2 (e). See note 1 supra. Further, employers may dis-
criminate: against members of the Communist party, id. § 2000e-2(f); in the interests
of national security, id. § 2000e-2 (g); according to bona fide seniority, merit, or piece
work systems, id. § 2000e-2(h); or on the basis of the results of any "professionally devel-
oped ability test" provided such test is not used or designed to discriminate. Id.
16. To be covered by the Act an employer must be "engaged in an industry affecting
commerce." Id. § 2000e(b). See note 13 supra. The term "industry affecting commerce"
is broader than it might appear initially. It includes "any activity, business, or industry
in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the
free flow of commerce. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1970). This definition was bor-
rowed from labor legislation, see Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29
U.S.C. § 402(c) (1970), and has been given the broadest meaning possible under the
Civil Rights Act. Once an employer is found to be one affecting commerce, all his
employees, no matter what their jobs may be, are covered.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1970).
18. The Act covers hiring, dischargegs,-compensation, employment referrals, mem-
bership and expulsion fr6m membiership, classification, training, promotion, and term,
conditions, and privileges of employment. Id.
19. Id. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1970).
20. See EEOC Decision No. 70-75, CCH EEOC DEcisioNs (1973) 6049 (Aug. 13,
1969).
21. Section 706(g) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice . . . the court
may enjoin the respondent... and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay . .. or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g).
The section limits injunctive (as opposed to declaratory) relief to cases of "inten-
tional" violation. The phrase "intentionally engaged in" has been construed to mean
only that the defendant meant to do what he did; that his act was not accidental. No
showing of malice or discriminatory intent is required, but such intent is inferred from
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relief as well as affirmative relief, such as hiring and reinstatement
awards, with or without back pay.22 There is also a statutory provision
calling for payment of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.23 Back
pay awards, coupled with attorney's fees, create a potent remedy espe-
cially where fringe benefit discrimination is involved. Because lengthy
court actions can lead to substantial accrual of back pay, which would
include a substantial accrual of fringe benefits as well, and because class
actions involving a number of employees are frequently the vehicle used
to litigate discrimination cases, 24 a back pay award is likely to involve
a large sum of money.
Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act,25 which predates the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
prohibits paying different wages to men than are paid to women for
a practice continued after discriminatory effects are made known. See Local 189, AFL-
CIO v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court, in rejecting an
employer's good faith defense, stated that "good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.
. . . [Rather] Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employ-
ment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432. For a detailed study of treatment
by the Federal Courts of the intent requirement, see Comment, Back Pay for Employ-
ntent Discrinination Under Title VII-Role of the Judiciary in Exercising Its Discretion,
23 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 525 (1974), which concluded that the courts have made it easy
to demonstrate this requisite in a desire to give Title VII a deterrent effect as well as
a compensatory one.
22. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(g) (1970). The 1972 amendment to Title VII provides that
back pay liability may extend to two years before the original filing of the complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Though within a court's discretion, a back pay award is allowed as a matter of
course where the employee has shown some compensable damage. In one case a court
has issued a back pay award where the plaintiffs did not even plead for that relief.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835 (1970), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on
other grounds, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
Thus, when an employer is found guilty of discrimination in employee benefits, most of
which involve monetary payments, he can expect a court to award those benefits in
back pay to the employees discriminated against.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
24. The federal courts look favorably on class actions in Title VII cases. See, e.g.,
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir., 1968), in which the court
stated: "Racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination, and to require a
multiplicity of separate, identical charges before the EEOC, filed against the same
employer, as a prerequisite to relief through resort to the court would tend to frustrate
our system of justice and order." The same logic would apply as well to sex discrimi-
nation.
25. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
4 206(d) (1970), and embodied in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970)).
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performing similar work.26 Protection extends to employees "engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or [who
are] employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the pro-
duction of goods for commerce." 27 Under this statutory language an
individual employee is covered if he is engaged in commerce even
though the enterprise may not be.28 While the coverage by Title VII
of employers affecting commerce is broader than that by the Fair
Labor Standards Act (which encompasses the Equal Pay Act),29 there
is no corresponding limitation of coverage in the latter act based on
the number of workers employed by a particular employer.30 Although
this broad coverage was limited by specific exemptions, 31 the 1974
amendments32 to the Equal Pay Act eradicated the most significant of
these exclusions by bringing state, local, and most federal government
employees under the purview of the Act.3
26. Section 206(d) (1) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are em-
ployed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1970).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1970). The term "enterprise" is itself broadly defined, the
Act making it clear that coverage is not confined to a single unit of a multi-unit business
where one of the units is involved in commerce: "'Enterprise' means the related activi-
ties performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person
or persons for a common business purpose ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 203 (r) (1970). For a more
complete discussion of the enterprise concept, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.202, 779.204 (1975).
"Related activities" is discussed at id. §§ 779.205-779.211. The enterprise concept was
upheld as constitutional in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
An "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce"
is also broadly defined. It means "any of the following in the activities of which em-
ployees are so engaged, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working
on goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person ...
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
28. Cf. Snelling v. O.K. Service Garage, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Ky. 1970).
29. See note 25 supra.
30. See note 13 supra.
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1970).
32. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 615).
33. See id. § 6. Prior to 1966, state employees were exempted from coverage by the
Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970). The Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830, provided exceptions to this rule
in the case of certain hospital, school, and railroad employees. Id. § 102(b). When a
group of state employees brought suit against the state to recover overtime pay under
section 16(b), the Supreme Court held that such an action could not be brought by state
19751
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Remedies, as well as coverage, under the Equal Pay Act are deter-
mined by the general provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Re-
covery of back wages can be accomplished through a suit either by
the individual employee or by the Secretary of Labor. 34 Section 16(b)
of the Act allows an employee to sue for the amount that he was under-
paid, or for an equal amount in liquidated damages, and further provides
for payment of attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff. 5 As
amended in 1974, section 16(c) now permits an employee to be
awarded the same damages in a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor.3 6
In suits for back wages, the statute of limitations runs for two years in
the case of nonwillful violations; 3 in the case of willful violations,
which also carry the possibility of fine and imprisonment, the limita-
tion period is three years.3 Significantly, this limitation period is of
minor import in sex discrimination cases involving fringe benefits, be-
employees in federal court because of immunity granted to the state by the eleventh
amendment. Employees of the Dep't of Public Health and Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Public Health and Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). See note 87
infra & accompanying text. The Court noted that, although coverage of some state
employees had been granted, Congress had not lifted sovereign immunity from the
states in the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Secretary of Labor nonetheless maintained
enforcement authority against the state in federal court; and the Supreme Court left
open the question of whether the employees could sue the state in a state court. The
majority of the Court apparently felt that Congress could lift the constitutional im-
munity of the states simply by putting a specific provision in section 16(b). 411 U.S. at
285-86. In addition to providing coverage to a larger group of public employees, the
1974 amendment included a section specifically waiving sovereign immunity in Fair
Labor Standards Act cases. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259, § 6(6) (d) (1), 88 Star. 55.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), (c) (1970).
35. Id. § 216(b). The Portal to Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1970), amended this
remedy to allow an employer to raise good faith as a defense to a liquidated damage
demand.
36. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 26, 88 Stat. 55.
Formerly, under section 16(c) the Secretary of Labor was precluded from bringing
suit on behalf of an employee when there was an unsettled issue of law. Additionally,
the Secretary could bring suit only when the employee had made a written request for
him to do so. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970). The Secretary could avoid the additional
prerequisites of section 216(c) by bringing suit under the injunctive process provided for
by section 17. Id. § 217. Although the back pay award was the same under section 17,
no liquidated damages were prescribed. By changing section 16(c) to eliminate the need
for a written request from the complainant and to permit a suit by the Secretary when
unsettled areas of law are at issue, the 1974 amendment made suit by the Secretary under
section 16(c), and therefore recovery of liquidated damages, more likely. Pub. L. No.
93-259, § 26, 88 Stat. 55.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1970).
38. Id. §§ 216(a), 255(a).
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cause violations in such cases are of a continuing nature.39 Only where
an employer has changed the benefit program to correct prior inequality
and the time period has run would an employee be barred by limita-
tions.
Executive Order 11246
Pursuant to the federal government's power to set its own terms and
conditions when negotiating with private parties,40 Executive Order
1124641 was issued to prohibit discrimination by government contrac-
tors. The order mandates that each government contractor agree to
''not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 Equality of
treatment in rates of pay and other forms of employee compensation is
specifically covered by the order.43 Further, the ambit of the order is
far-reaching, extending, with a few exemptions, to all subcontracts and
purchasing orders made by prime contractors.44
Enforcement power under the order was given to the Secretary of
Labor, who delegated this responsibility to the Director of the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). 4 Unlike Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act, suits by individual plaintiffs to recover compensatory
damages are not authorized. Further, the OFCC does not have power
under the order to bring a court action against a contractor; remedial
action is limited to sanctions and penalties. The major penalty provision
authorizes cancellation, suspension, or termination of the contract, and
prohibits any violator from securing future government contracts in
the absence of the Secretary's approval. 46 These measures, and their
attendant deterrent effect, encompass the order's total enforcement
scheme, leaving aggrieved individuals without redress. To alleviate this
inadequacy, the order allows the OFCC to recommend that proceedings
39. In the context of a Title VII case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
noted that "[it is settled law that the . . . limitation [period] is no bar when a con-
tinuing practice of discrimination is being challenged rather than a single, isolated
discriminatory act." Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.
1971), citing Cox v. United States Gypsum Co, 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
40. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940).
41. 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974). Executive Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967), added
sex as a basis for discrimination under the original order.
42. 3 C.F.R. § 170 (1974).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 171.
45. 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966).
46. 3 C.F.R. at § 174.
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be instituted against the employer under Title VII.47 Thus while the
executive order bars discrimination in fringe benefit compensation, it
may add little to the development of nondiscriminatory practices be-
cause of inadequate enforcement mechanisms.
Fourteenth Amendment
Aside from Title VII, the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, prohibiting the states from depriving any person
of the equal protection of the laws and from denying due process to
any person within its jurisdiction,48 has been the most frequently used
basis for sex discrimination actions. The equal protection clause, 4 and
more recently the due process clause,50 have proven useful tools for
plaintiffs in such cases and have major relevance to discrimination in
employee fringe benefits.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court consistently has ruled that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment allows the states to
provide different classes of people with different treatment under the
law." The Court merely requires that the classification be "reasonable,
not arbitrary, and . .. rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike." 52 This two-part "ra-
47. Id. See Maroze, Back Pay Awards: A Renedy Under Executive Order 11296, 22
BuFFALO L. REv. 439 (1973), for a view that the executive order permits enforcing
agencies to obtain back pay awards.
48. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONs-. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ.,
473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); LeFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir.
1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp.
1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
50. See note 85 infra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a treatment
of the distinction between the equal protection clause and the due process clause in sex
discrimination cases, see Comment, Due Process and the Pregnant Worker: the New
Weapon in the Equal Rights Arsenal, 23 EMORY L.J. 787 (1974).
51. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 396 U.S. 802 (1969); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
52. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552 (1947).
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tional basis test" presumes that the classification in question is consti-
tutional53 and gives the states great latitude in proving that it is reason-
able." Mere reasonableness, however, will not support a suspect classi-
fication,5 5 or one which affects a fundamental interest. 6 Such a classi-
fication is subject to "strict scrutiny"; the state bears "a far heavier
burden of justification" 57 in that it must show that the classification is
a necessary means of achieving a legitimate state purpose. 8 The pre-
53. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1959); United States v. Carolene Prods..
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
54. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
55. Cases finding or strongly intimating that suspect classifications were under review
include: Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 410 (1966) (wealth); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
(race); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national ancestry).
Although the Court has never given a strict definition of "suspect class," such classes
are generally based upon congenital and unalterable traits, with the exception of
wealth, which also may be determined in large part by the circumstances of birth. A
likely distinction between these classifications and those not declared suspect is that
persons in the former category are disadvantaged politically to the extent that the courts
may be their only recourse. Mr. Justice Stewart suggested this reasoning in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., when he stated that "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
56. Those interests arguably declared "fundamental" by the Supreme Court are: vot-
ing, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); marriage, see Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); procre-
ation, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); rights in the criminal process, see
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); education, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); and interstate travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Like
the cases involving suspect classifications, the Court's reasoning is not stated explicitly,
but one can conjecture that these rights are either very personal or are related to main-
taining democratic ideals. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969), where the Court, discussing the right to vote, stated that "[slince the right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Id. at 626 quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 562 (1969).
57. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964). In declaring unconstitutional a
law which prohibited cohabitation by a man and woman of different races, the Court
found that the state had not successfully carried this burden. See also Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (an antimiscegenation statute created a "very heavy burden
of justification"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (emergency
legislation ordering the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from large portions
of the West Coast required "the most rigid scrutiny").
58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (a suspect classification required a
showing that it was "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objec-
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sumption of validity arising under the rational basis test is not applied. 9
Although a majority of the Supreme Court has never ruled that sex
is an inherently suspect classification, 60 the Court nonetheless has barred
certain classifications based on sex, developing a "strict rational basis"
test, a standard of inquiry situated between the extremes of the "strict
scrutiny" and "rational basis" tests.6 The first tentative statement by
the Supreme Court of the strict rational basis test was made in Reed v.
Reed,62 a unanimous decision in which the Court declared unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the equal protection clause a state statute 63 cre-
ating a preference for men over women as administrators of estates. The
Court's reasoning began with the finding that because the statute "pro-
vides that different treatment be accorded to . ..applicants on the
basis of their sex ... it . . . establishes a classification subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause." 64 Use of the word "scrutiny,"
however, was not meant to imply inquiry under the strict scrutiny test
for the Court turned to the rational basis test,65 holding that the means
employed in the statute lacked a demonstrably rational relationship to
the stated purpose of the legislation.6" Imposition of the "scrutiny"
element was to negate the presumption of validity which prevails under
the rational basis test, and to shift the burden of proving rationality
to the state.
tive, independent of ...racial discrimination"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964) (a suspect classification should be upheld only if it was "necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy").
59. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1964), in which the Court rejected the
state's argument that the classification should be upheld if there was any possible basis
for concluding that it served a "rational purpose." The Court distinguished nonsuspect
classifications which led the courts to defer to the legislative judgment. Id. at 8-9.
60. For state court decisions declaring sex a suspect classification under state and
federal equal protection clauses, see Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599
(1973); Sail'r Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
61. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-36 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and
Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L. J. 1071, 1075-79 (1974); Note, The Decline and
Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489, 1507-08
(1972).
62. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
63. IDAHO CODE § 15-312,-314 (1948).
64. 404 U.S. at 75.
65. Id. at 76, citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
66. Id. at 76-77. The stated purpose of the statute was to ease the workload of state
courts in choosing administrators. The Court held, however, that as applied, the statute
was "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause .... ." Id. at 76.
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In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,67 the Supreme Court
enunciated more clearly the strict rational basis test, although not in
the context of sex discrimination. The challenged statute 8 in Weber
barred illegitimate children from recovering death benefits under a
workman's compensation claim. Declaring the statute unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Court reasoned that the "essential inquiry ... is ... inevitably a dual
one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote?
What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" "
The first question is substantially a statement of the rational basis test,
which is then modified by the inquiry in the second question, embody-
ing the concept of scrutiny where fundamental individual interests are
jeopardized. Under this test, the Court focuses primarily on the statu-
tory means adopted to accomplish the stated legislative purpose, and
imposes a positive showing of rationality between the two as a require-
ment of constitutionality.
The first major Supreme Court decision in a sex discrimination case
following Reed was Frontiero v. Richardson,70 wherein the Court in-
validated, under the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment,
federal statutes which established markedly different standards for men
and women in the armed services for receiving allowances for depend-
ent spouses.71 The decision was diluted, however, by the filing of sep-
arate opinions. Four justices7-2 relied on Reed, applying the strict ra-
tional basis test as a foundation for a holding of unconstitutionality.73
Four concurring members74 applied the strict scrutiny test, declaring
sex to be a suspect classification. 75
Following Frontiero, the strict rational basis test was employed in
67. 406 U.S. 164 (1971).
68. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1021(3) (1964).
69. 406 U.S. at 173.
70. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
71. The statutes required an affirmative showing by female members that their hus-
bands in fact were dependent for more than one half of their support. No such showing
was required of male servicemen. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) (c) (1970); Pay and Allowances
of Uniformed Services Act § 401, Pub. L. No. 87-649, 76 Stat. 469 (1962), as amended
37 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1973).
72. The four justices were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Blackmun, and
Stewart.
73. 411 U.S. at 691.
74. The concurring justices were Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall;
Justice Rehnquist dissented.
75. 411 U.S. at 682.
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Kahn v. Shevin,76 wherein the Court held valid a state statute77 granting
a $500 property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers. The
Court in Kahn, noting that the object of the statute was to ease the
widow's financial burden, held that, given the documented earnings
differential between men and women,78 the classification had a "fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 79
Recently, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 0 the Court declared section
402 (g) of the Social Security Act8 x a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fifth amendment. This section provided survivor's bene-
fits to a widow and minor children based on the earnings of a deceased
husband and father, but allowed benefits based on the earnings of a
deceased wife and mother to flow solely to her minor children. Although
the Government attempted to justify the classification on economic
grounds, the Court chose not to follow the analysis used in Kahn,"2
and approached this problem utilizing a Frontiero rationale, holding
that "the gender based distinction of [the section] is entirely irra-
tional" 83 and unrelated to the stated purpose of the statute.84
Reed, Frontiero, Kahn, and Weinberger, viewed together, reflect the
Court's present attitude toward classifications based upon sex. That
attitude is expressed in the strict rational basis test which essentially
probes the objective of the legislation under review and questions
whether the classification substantially furthers that end.85
76. 94 S.Ct. 1734 (1974).
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.191(7) (1971) ($500 property tax exemption for females
but not males).
78. The Court took a realistic look at the earnings difference between men and
women finding that women in 1972 earned 57.9 percent of the median income of men.
94 S. Ct. at 1736. The statistics cited were convincing: "There can be no dispute that
the financial difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State
exceed those facing the man .... While the widower can usually continue the occu-
pation which preceded his spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself
suddenly in a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because of her
former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer." Id. at 1736-37. The
Court also relied on the fact that this was tax legislation, an area in which states are
given a large degree of freedom in making classifications to produce reasonable systems
of taxation. Id. at 1737.
79. Id. at 1737.
80. 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
81. Social Security Act § 202 (g), 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970).
82. See notes 76-79 supra & accompanying text.
83. 95 S. Ct. at 1235.
84. The Court saw the main purpose of the statute as providing the parent the oppor-
tunity to stay home and care for the children instead of working. Id. at 1233.
85. Equal protection, however, is not the sole constitutional ground for attacking
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I All suits brought under the fourteenth amendment must of course
involve "state action," I6 and once this prerequisite is met, it must be
decided against whom suit can be maintained. The Supreme Court has
held that under the eleventh amendment "an unconsenting state is im-
mune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well
as by citizens of another state." 87 This protection, however, does not
extend to state employees.
In Ex Parte Young,88 for example, an injunction was sought against
a state attorney general, rather than the state, to restrain enforcement
of a statute allegedly in violation of the Federal Constitution. The
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not
protect this official because he was acting outside the permissible scope
of authority in violating the Constitution.8 Similarly, when a state or
state agency is administering an employee benefit program which dis-
criminates on the basis of sex, at the very least a suit can be brought
against a state official to enjoin the use of such a program.
There exists, however, an apparent judicial reluctance to award full
damages when an employee of a state is sued as an individual. In Edel-
man v. Jordan9° the Supreme Court held that a welfare recipient was
not entitled to sue for retroactive benefits which were withheld in
violation of federal law. Although the action was brought against a
sex discrimination. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), school
board rules requiring pregnant teachers to terminate their employment at least four
months prior to delivery was held unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The majority of the Supreme Court found that the rules ex-
pressed an "irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency" for all pregnant
teachers and thereby denied submission of medical evidence to the contrary. Id. at 644.
Similar reasoning was used in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), to invalidate a
statute which contained an irrebuttable presumption that unmarried fathers are unfit
to take custody of their children at the death of the children's mother.
Arguably, these cases should have been decided solely on equal protection grounds.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651-53 (Powell, J., concurring). Re-
liance upon due process as a basis of decision was vigorously criticized in the dissents of
both LaFleur and Stanley. 414 U.S. at 657-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 405 U.S. at
659 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Note, The Decline and Fall of the Now Equal
Protection: A Polenical Approach, 58 VA. L. REv. 1489, 1502-05 (1972).
86. See, e.g., Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840 (1974).
When alleged discrimination involves a state employee there -rests a cause of action
under the fourteenth amendment. In addition, some employee benefit programs are
administered by the states, thereby satisfying the requisite for state action even though
the employer is not a governmental unit.
87. Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1355 (1974).
88. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
89. Id. at 159-60.
90. 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
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state official, the Court felt that any monetary recovery in reality
would come from the state treasury:
These funds will obviously not be paid out of the pocket of peti-
tioner Edelman .... The funds to satisfy the award in this case
must inevitably come from the general revenues of the State of
Illinois, and thus the award resembles far more closely the mone-
tary award against the State itself . . . than it does the prospective
injunctive relief awarded in Ex Parte Young.91
Distinguishing the monetary consequences of prospective relief brought
about by an injunction from an outright monetary award for retro-
active benefits, the Court realized that some monetary expenditure was
unavoidable with an injunction: "Such an ancillary effect on the state
treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the
principle announced in Ex Parte Young..." 92 The majority reasoned
that retroactive payments, though perhaps a type of "equitable restitu-
tion," were sufficiently different in form from such restitution pro-
hibited by the eleventh amendment. 93
To summarize what may happen when an action for discrimination
in employee benefits is brought under the equal protection clause: (a)
the action cannot be brought against the state in its name but rather
must be brought against a state official;94 (b) recovery generally will
be limited to injunctive relief against that state official barring the dis-
criminatory practice;9 (c) monetary relief from the state treasury will
not be permitted, and where recovery is sought from a state official in
91. Id. at 1356-57. Denial of benefits in Edehnan hinged on the fact that the plaintiff
was in reality seeking payment from the state. In a very limited number of cases,
actions brought under the fourteenth amendment have permitted recovery from a state
official. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974), the Supreme Court faced the
question of whether a federal district court properly had dismissed an action filed against
state officials seeking damages as a result of shootings by National Guardsmen at Kent
State University. Holding that there was an improper dismissal, the Court determined
that the eleventh amendment did not protect state officials from all possible recovery,
noting that "damages against individual defendants are a permissible remedy in some
circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office." Id. at 1687,
citing Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). These cases which allow recovery from
individual public officials spring from exceptional circumstances where injunctive relief
would be meaningless. Significantly, in Scheuer the Court was persuaded by the fact
that the plaintiffs were seeking only to hold the state officials, and not the state, liable
for the actions at Kent State.
92. 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1358 (1974).
93. Id.
94. See notes 87 and 88 supra & accompanying text.
95. See note 91 supra & accompanying text.
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his individual capacity, liability will be imposed only when that offi-
cial practices a knowledgeable abuse of federal rights. 0 In this latter
case, the size of recovery may be limited where a large class of plaintiffs
seeks a monetary award from an individual defendant.
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS TO SPECIFIC EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
The varying federal standards pertaining to sex discrimination have
created problems for the employer in the choice and funding of em-
ployee benefits. Notably, even a good faith attempt at nondiscrimina-
tory treatment may result in liability depending on the standard by
which the employer's actions are judged.97 An examination of preg-
nancy coverage in disability insurance, retirement benefits, death bene-
fits, and life insurance illustrates the problems confronted by employers
in dealing with these fringe benefits.
Pregnancy-Related Disabilities in Company Insurance Plans
The propriety of including or excluding pregnancy-related disabili-
ties from coverage in company insurance plans is an issue acutely evi-
dencing lack of uniformity by federal courts and agencies in coping with
sex discrimination problems. Both the OFCC guideliness and the Wage
96. See, e.g., Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973). Therein the plaintiff
brought a section 1983 action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), challenging a rule of the South
Carolina legislature that permitted only males to serve that body. The court of appeals
found discrimination in violation of the Constitution, subjecting only the clerk of the
legislature to possible liability. The court then accepted a good faith defense stating:
In the area of sex discrimination, the inchoate state of legal guidelines suggest
that good faith, coupled with reasonable grounds to believe one is acting
within the law, should be sufficient to preclude liability .... Properly ap-
plied, such a test, based on the circumstances of each case, maintains the
effectiveness of 1983 actions while providing conscientious state officials with
some protection against the cutting edge of a rapidly developing legal doc-
trine.
476 F.2d at 229. Note that in Eslinger after disposing of the question of recovery on
good faith grounds, it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether in reality the
recovery of damages would be coming from the state and therefore barred by the
eleventh amendment. Id. at 229 n.3.
97. See note 21 stpra.
98. The OFCC guidelines provide in pertinent part: "The employer must not make
any distinction based upon the sex in employment opportunities, wages, hours, or other
conditions of employment. In the area of employer contributions for insurance, pen-
sions, welfare programs and other similar "fringe benefits" the employer will not be
considered to have violated these guidelines if his contributions are the same for men
and women or if the resulting benefits are equal." 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(c) (1974). The
guidelines also provide that women are "not [to] be penalized in their conditions of
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and Hour guidelines"'9 state that, with respect to insurance coverage, an
employer will not be found to have practiced sex discrimination if his
contributions are the same for men and women, or if the resulting bene-
fits are equal. These standards apparently allow an employer to exclude
pregnancy-related disabilities from a group insurance plan.'00 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello'0' held that under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment a state need not
include coverage of pregnancy in its disability insurance system. A
contrary result would be reached under section 1604.10(b) of the
EEOC guidelines'0 2 which states that pregnancy is a temporary disabil-
employment because they require time away from work on account of childbearing."
Id. § 60-20.2 (g) ()-(2).
99. The wage and hour division has determined that wages for equal pay purposes
cover "all payments made to or on behalf of the employee as remuneration for em-
ployment," 29 C.F.R. § 800.100 (1975), and this includes compensation bearing no direct
relation to hours of employment or particular jobs performed. Id. § 800.113. The guide-
lines state:
If employer contributions to a plan providing insurance or similar benefits
to employees are equal for both men and women, no wage differential pro-
hibited by the equal pay provisions will result from such payments, even
though the benefits which accrue to the employees are greater for one sex
than the other. The mere" fact that the employer may make unequal contri-
butions for employees of opposite sexes in such a situation will not, how-
ever, be considered to indicate the employer's payments are in violation ...
if the resulting benefits are equal for such employees.
Id. § 800.116(d). The guidelines also specifically exclude "payments related to matern-
ity" as not within the term "wages" for equal pay purposes.
It should be noted that application of the Equal Pay Act to health insurance plans
is uncertain under the current guidelines. One court, for instance, in rejecting an
employer's valuation of fringe benefits in computing employees' wages, stated: "XVe
note also that it is far from clear that standard types of fringe benefits are eligible for
inclusion in 'equal pay' determinations." Hodgsor v. Brookhaven General Hospital,
436 F.2d 719, 723 n.1 (5th Cir. 1970).
Although an employer's subjective valuation of fringe benefits Fhould not be allowed
to defeat the purposes of the Equal Pay Act, fringe benefits are an integral part of
an employer's total wage costs and logically should be included in determining equality
of pay.
100. It would appear that as long as an employer designates that his lump sum pay-
ment to an insurance company is to cover all employees, he has made equal contribu-
tions and has satisfied both guidelines regardless of whether pregnancy-related disabili-
ties are included in the plan.
101. 94 S. Cr. 2485 (1974). Commentary on Aiello may be found in: Erickson,
Women and The Supreme Court: Anatomy is Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L. Rrv. 209, 267-82
(1974); Note, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1532 (1974); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Def-
nition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COL:m. L. Riw-v. 441 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preg-
n7acy Classifications]; 3 HOFsTRA L. REV. 141 (1975); 13 J. Fc.Imuv L. 867 (1973-74).
102. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973).
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ity and as such "payment under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan . . . shall be applied to disability due to
pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are
applied to other temporary disabilities." 103 Title VII then, as construed
by the EEOC, requires an employer with a short-term disability plan to
include coverage of pregnancy-related disabilities.
Section 703 (a) (1) of Title VI. 0 4 does not, on its face, dictate the
conclusion set forth in the EEOC guidelines. The Act merely states
that an employer may not discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
on the basis of sex. The weight of authority, however, has followed
section 1604.10(b), relying upon the general principle that the inter-
pretation of a statute by an agency entrusted with its enforcement is
to be accorded great deference. 10 5 Such deference is questionable be-
cause the administrative history of the guidelines affords "no factual
basis upon which these regulations were drawn." 10 Further "[v]ir-
tually all Title VII violations fit an equal protection definition of sex
discrimination-dissimilar treatment for similarly situated men and
women," 107 and it is therefore arguable that the Supreme Court's hold-
103. Id. The guidelines also stand in contrast to those of the OFCC and Wage and
Hour Division in stating: "It shall not be a defense under Title VIII (sic) to a charge
of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect
to one sex than the other." Id. § 1604.9(e).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1970).
105. See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661, 664 n.12 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975), quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971) (agency guidelines to be given "great deference" in construc-
tion of Act it is to enforce); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d
Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3624 (U.S. May 27, 1975), citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., supra; Communications Workers of America v. A.T.&T., 513 F.2d 1024, 1030
(2d Cir. 1975), quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra.
106. Newman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238, 245 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See
also Comment, Current Trends in Pregnancy Benefits-1972 EEOC Guidelines Inter-
preted, 24 DEPAUm L. REv. 127, 129-31 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy Benefits].
Utilizing this rationale the Newman court rejected section 1604.10(b) and made an
independent finding that pregnancy is not a sickness or disability "in the usual sense of
the word." 374 F. Supp. at 246. See Ray-O-Vac v. Wisconsin Dep't of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations, 8 E.P.D. 9656 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1974). It is difficult, however, to
accept the Newvman finding that "upon examining the actual wording of the guidelines
it is not apparent that they actually equate pregnancy with disability or sickness," 374
F. Supp. at 245, because section 1604.10(b) points so conclusively to a contrary con-
clusion.
107. Rofford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316, 319 (S.D.
Fla. 1972). See Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668-69 (4th Cir. 1975)
(Widener, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975). States one
19751
126 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:109
ing in Aiello may be extended beyond an equal protection clause con-
text, signalling the demise of section 1604.10(b). 108
In Aiello, the plaintiff argued that California's employee-financed
disability insurance program violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution by excluding coverage for disabilities attributable to preg-
nancy. Other disabilities for which relief was unavailable included
dipsomenia, drug addiction and sexual psychopathia. The program, de-
signed to be self-supportive, compensated temporarily disabled private
employees not covered by workman's compensation. Benefits were
funded exclusively from a one percent tax on employees not protected
by a state-approved private plan, and payments extended up to 26
weeks.'09 The defendant argued that inclusion of pregnancy would
significantly increase the program's costs and thereby force the state to
raise the contribution rate or decrease the benefits allowable. The Court
concluded that California could exclude coverage of pregnancy related
disabilities.
In Satty v. Nashville Gas Co.,110 an early district court case con-
fronting the interpretational issue of whether Aiello should be extended
to Title VII, it was stated that "[t]he dispute within the [Aiello]
Court ... does not appear to be whether California's statute discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex, but rather the dispute focuses on whether that
discrimination is permissible under the fourteenth amendment, i.e.,
it is a question of legislative reasonableness." "1I Though Satty's phrase-
commentator: "If lAiello] is correct in its analysis that California's exclusion of dis-
tbility benefits for pregnancy is not discrimination based upon sex, the analysis would
be expected to be the same in the context of a Title VII employer-employee case.
Surely sex discrimination cannot mean one thing for equal protection purposes and
another for Title VII." 3 HOFsMA L. REv. 141, 147 (1975).
108. See, e.g., Pregnzancy Classifications, supra note 101, at 442, 456 n.84, 462-67.
109. 94 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
110. 384 F. Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
111. Id. at 771 n.l. In making this statement, the court was reviewing an employer's
mandatory maternity leave policy, which it found to be discriminatory. Yet the court
did not find sex discrimination in a group health insurance plan which provided for the
complete cost of hospitalization for all disabilities except pregnancy, for which a 50 per-
cent coverage was afforded both to female employees and the wives of male employees.
In validating this plan the court looked solely to section 1604.9(a) of the EEOC guide-
lines, which states that the same benefits must be available to female employees as are
available to the wives of male employees. Id. at 767, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1975).
It is probable that in reaching this result the Satty court simply overlooked section
1604.10(b). Another interpretation of the decision, however, suggested more for its
novelty than for its soundness, is that the case holds sub silentio that section 1604.9
pre-empts section 1604.10(b) when the two clash. Arguably, when a wife of a male
employee receives partial disability coverage for pregnancy, such a benefit naturally
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ology in posing the interpretational issue it confronted is somewhat less
than objective, presupposing that discrimination of some degree did
indeed exist in Aiello, the court, in confining the scope of Aiello to the
fourteenth amendment, logically supported its conclusion by quoting the
following language from the Supreme Court decision:
This Court has held that, consistently with the Equal Protection
Clause, a State "may take one step at a time, addressing itself to
the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind . . ." Particularly with respect of social welfare programs,
so long as the line drawrn by the State is rationally supportable,
the courts will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate
stopping point.112
Following this rationale, three courts of appeals, confronting a com-
pany plan excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from insurance cov-
erage, held Aiello inapplicable to a determination of whether sex dis-
crimination under Title VII was being practiced. In Wetzel v. Liberty
Mutual Company,"' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dis-
tinguished Aiello by noting: "ouir case is one of statutory interpretation
rather than one of constitutional analysis;" "' this language was quoted
with approval by the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert v. General Electric
Company." 5 Finally, in Communication Workers of America v.
A'T.&T.," 6 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that
Aiello "deals with the constitutional validity of legislative classifications
flows to the husband, warranting no greater coverage for female employees. Such a
construction presupposes a policy judgment in the guidelines that, in the absence of a
scale which can balance male employee interests against the interests of female em-
ployees, the latter are to receive full benefits in the area of pregnancy-related disabilities,
but when the interests of male employees are placed on the scale by receiving benefits
through coverage to their wives, such a receipt of benefits to the male justifies only like
coverage to female employees. States Satty:
[Tlhe insurance program makes a distinction in the case of pregnancy as
to the extent of benefits available. However, the pregnancy distinction ap-
plies to both male and female employee-beneficiaries of the plan. The insur-
ance proceeds are paid on behalf of the employee, male or female, according
to a single formula in all pregnancy cases. Thus for a male employee whose
wife is pregnant, the insurance benefit is the same as provided to a pregnant
female employee ....
384 F. Supp. at 766-67.
112. 384 F. Supp. at 769 (emphasis supplied by Satty court), quoting 94 S. Ct. at 2491.
113. 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3624 (U.S. Mlay 27, 1975).
114. Id. at 203.
115. 519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.WV. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 6,
1975).
116. 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975).
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under the Equal Protection Clause, the standards of judicial scrutiny
to be applied in making such a determination, and nothing more." 117
Such a narrow interpretation of Aiello, though reasonable, is not
necessarily correct. Aiello, in its now often quoted footnote 20, stated
in regard to the California plan:
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as
such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most
cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into
two groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members
of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program
thus accrue to members of both sexes."18
In the body of the text, it was further stated:
There is no evidence in the record that the selection of risks in-
sured by the program worked to discriminate against any definable
group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by
that group or class from the program. There is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk
from which women are protected and men are not." 9
Footnote 20, unrestricted in its phraseology, may readily be inter-
preted as holding that sex discrimination per se does not exist when
pregnancy is excluded from coverage under any insurance plan.12 Ac-
ceptance of this interpretation leads, through the use of a simple syllo-
gism, to the conclusion that section 1604.10(b) of the EEOC guidelines
imposes a stricter standard upon Title VII than the face of the statute
demands: (1) The Supreme Court has declared that exclusion of preg-
nancy from an insurance program is not sex discrimination; (2) Title
VII, on its face, does not impose a stricter mandate upon an employer
than the prohibition that he is not to discriminate on the basis of sex,
and therefore, (3) exclusion of coverage for pregnancy-related disabili-
ties from an insurance program does not violate Title VII. Utilizing
this rationale it is arguable that section 1604.10(b) may be rejected as
"there are 'compelling indications that it is wrong.' " 121
117. Id. at 1030.
118. 94S. Ct. at 2492 n.20.
119. ld. at 2492.
120. See notes 107-08 supra & accompanying text.
121. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973), quoting Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
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It should be noted that the approach taken in Aiello was not novel.
In both Reed and Frontiero the Court defined sex discrimination as
"dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situ-
ated." 122 In the context of group insurance coverage this test simply
demands that there must be no risk from which one sex is protected and
the other is not. Such a "risk-oriented" doctrine recognizes that sex-
linked disabilities simply cannot be computed in any equation balancing
equality of rights among the sexes. 123 Mandating coverage of preg-
nancy-related disabilities, with their attendant high costs, necessarily
deprives males of coverage they would otherwise receive. On the other
hand, mandating exclusion of such coverage forces women to assume
the costs of a condition created solely by the happenstance of their
sex. Preference of one cause over the other necessarily involves an
arbitrary decision. Paradoxically, either course apparently discrimi-
nates against one sex or the other. Such a paradox suggests the gov-
ernment and courts choose neither mandate, but rather leave the deci-
sion of excluding or including coverage of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties to individual employers. Notions of fundamental fairness, how-
ever, would seem to dictate that the government and courts prevent an
employer from offering an insurance plan which excludes coverage for
the unique disabilities of one sex only.
Retirewent Plans
Retirement plans, which seek to provide an income fQr retirees, also
pose acute problems when examined for discriminatory features. Two
basic types of retirement plans are used currently: the "thrift" or
"savings" plan involving employee contributions to a retirement fund
which are matched on some scheduled basis by the employer, and the
pension plan or annuity set up by the employer individually or in con-
junction with an insurer. Upon retirement, the employee receives a
lump sum under the savings plan, or begins to receive monthly pay-
ments under the annuity.124 Many pension plans also provide an option
for the employee to draw a lump sum rather than monthly install-
merits.
122. 411 U.S. at 688 (emphasis supplied), quoting 414 U.S. at 77.
123. See note 111 supra.
124. See generally L. BURGESS, WAGE AND SALARY ADMINISTRATION IN A DYNAMIC
ECONOMY 126-27 (1968).
125. See Hearings in the Matter of OFCC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, Section
60-20.3 (c) Before the Employment Standards Administration of the Dept. of Labor, pt.
2, at 34. (Sept. 9 and 10, 1974) [Hereinafter cited as OFCC Hearings].
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Assuming that the matching contributions by the employer under a
savings plan are made at the same rate for male and female employees,
no problem of discrimination arises when the employees receive lump
sums at retirement. Where pensions or annuities are offered as benefits,
however, there may be unavoidable discriminatory results. If equal
contributions are made by an employer to the plan, there is an equal
amount available for both male and female employees at retirement. 26
But insurers administering these plans make payouts based upon the
life expectancy of the employee after retirement. Since women out-
live men by an average of seven years, their individual payments are
less than those of their male counterparts. 127
This clearly discriminates against those women who do not meet
their projected life expectancy, and it treats every individual woman
as having a characteristic attributed to women as a group by providing
a lower monthly benefit than a man in a comparable position. To satisfy
the EEOC requirement that benefits be equal, 28 the employer must
make a greater proportionate contribution for his female employees.
But this weighted contributory scheme fails to eliminate discrimination
where the pension plan offers a lump sum option to the employee. The
female employee then has a greater lump sum available to her at retire-
ment than her male colleague, yet both have worked for identical periods
of time. 2  This situation would seem also to violate the EEOC stand-
ard.130 The fault may lie with the use of sex-based actuarial tables,"'
but it is contended that the basic position taken by the EEOC, that Title
VII demands provision of equal benefits in this area, needs to be recon-
sidered." 2
126. A concise explanation of annuities is presented in D. BICKELHATPT & J. MAGEE,
GENERAL INSURAN CE 725-52 (8th ed. 1972).
127. See J. TURNBULL, C. WILLIAMS, & E. CHEIT, EcoNoMIC AND SOCIAL SECURITY 29-38
(4th ed. 1973).
128. See note 103 supra, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1975).
129. The male is also penalized by his shorter life expectancy where the pension
plan offers an optional early retirement age. Even though the employer has contrib-
uted unequally to the plan so that equal benefits will be available at the mandatory re-
tirement age, should a male and a female decide to take advantage of the early retire-
ment feature of such a plan, the male will draw a smaller monthly benefit than the
female. See Haneberg, The EEOC and Employee Benefit Plans, 111 TRUSTS & ESTATES
726, 728 (Sept. 1972).
130. See generally Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifica-
tions in Pension Programs, 74 CoLum. L. REv. 1203 (1974).
131. Cf. notes 145-46 infra & accompanying text.
132. An EEOC interpretation, while entitled to "great deference," Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971), may not withstand judicial scrutiny "where there are
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The principal factor suggesting a need for close scrutiny of the pen-
sion question is the cost involved to the employer. Retirement plans are
presently the most expensive fringe benefits; 133 requiring an employer
to adjust his contributions upward to provide equal benefits could
result in an 11 to 15 per cent increase in that cost.' Where unrestricted
by existing contracts, an employer could simply reapportion his overall
contributions to equalize benefits, thus eliminating the benefit advantage
enjoyed by males. Until some means of adjustment is adapted by the
employer, however, he is exposed to significant potential liability in
the event of litigation. In Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,'35
for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reviewing a
plan whereby men were subject to higher optional and mandatory
retirement ages before they could receive full benefits, held that the
'compelling indications that it is wrong."' Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,
94-95 (1973), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
While there has been administrative enforcement of the EEOC guidelines, see, e.g.,
EEOC Dec. No. 74-118 (April 26, 1974) reported in 2 CCH EVIPL. PRAc. GUIDE 6431(1974), litigation is now initially reaching the courts. In Alanhart v. City of Los Angeles,
387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975), an injunction was issued preventing the defendant em-
ployer from requiring female employees to contribute a greater amount than male
employees in order to receive the same monthly benefits upon retirement. Though
there was not a complete hearing on the merits of the sex discrimination claim, in
ordering the injunction, the court had to rule that the plaintiffs would likely prevail on
the merits in the later hearing, relying on the EEOC guidelines to make that determi-
nation. The court also found that the actuarial treatment given men and women "in-
volves the application of characteristics that may be true of a class of people to indi-
viduals within the class for which the characterization may or may not be true." Id.
at 983.
133. OFCC Hearings, supra note 125, pt. 1, at 155. "For the employer, a retirement
program represents by far the most costly fringe benefit. In our experience retirement
programs cost over sixteen times as much as any other insurance benefit program for
the same employee." Statement by Robert Duncan, executive vice president and actuary
of Teacher's Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equi-
ties Fund (TIAA-CREF), the major insurer of college professors and administrators.
Id.
134. In the case of TIAA-CREF, see note 133 supra, retirement plan costs were ap-
proximately 12.5 percent of payroll. Bringing retirement benefits of women up to the
existing level of men would result in a 13.5 percent cost increase. See OFCC Hearings,
supra note 125, pt. I, at 154-55.
The predicted increase cited by TIAA-CREF is typical. Ms. Barbara La Utzenheiser,
representing the Health Insurance Association of America and the American Life In-
surance Association, stated that "the estimates of increased costs for female pension
benefits is between 13 and 15 percent." See OFCC Hearings, suipra, note 125, at 21.
See also Haneberg, supra note 129, at 728. This figure represents the increase for an
individual employee. An employer's overall increase in costs for a pension plan may
be lower depending on the percentage of women employed.
135. 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cit. 1973).
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employer was required to equalize benefits by paying damages to the
aggrieved male retirees. The court specifically ruled that the employer
could not lower the benefits accruing to female retirees to effect the
equalization.' 3
The Wage and Hour Division and the OFCC approval of equal
contributions 37 allow an employer to avoid this potential liability. Any
resultant discrimination would be the consequence of insurance indus-
try practice, rather than the conscious design of employers. The EEOC
rule, however, conceivably could result in discrimination in any event,
if the object is to insure equal monthly installments (assuming an option
to receive a lump sum is offered).
Where a state-administered program is challenged under the equal
protection clause, the distinction between men and women as to monthly
benefits should be upheld. This sex-based differentiation should with-
stand the rational basis test as applied by the Supreme Court,' 3 since
it bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to a permissible state
objective, 139 a solvent, self-sustaining retirement program maintained
by a low level of contribution.
Death Benefits and Life Insurance
A third major type of employee benefit is payment relating to the
death of the employee - company death benefits and life insurance. An
employer's policy of paying out company death benefits to surviving
spouses of male employees but not to the surviving spouses of female
employees has been held to be a violation of Title VII. 4 ° Although
such benefits are not explicitly covered by the Equal Pay Act, they
also appear to be within the ambit of the Wage and Hour Division
interpretation of wages which includes "insurance or similar benefits." "'
136. Id. at 96. Subsequent to the initiation of the suit, the EEOC regulations were
amended to prohibit the type of plan reviewed by the court in Rosen. 29 C.F.R.
5 1604.9(f) (1975). There is no substantive distinction between differing benefit levels
caused by differing retirement ages and those resulting from the plan structure itself.
Hence any employer offering a plan which pays unequal benefits may be forced to pay
the difference. Accord, Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957, 968-69 (D.
Md. 1973). But cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 8 E.P.D. 9685 (D. Conn. 1974) (injunctive
relief granted but award of damages denied because of lth amendment barrier).
137. See notes 98 and 99 supra.
138. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 94
S. Ct. 1734, 1737 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
139. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The lesser benefits are not a product
of overbroad generalization as was evident in the cases cited in note 138 supra.
140. EEOC Decision No. 70-513 (Feb. 4, 1970), CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 1208.69.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975). Such benefits also seem to be included by the
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Life insurance has become a significant employee benefit with the
advent of group life insurance policies, which in 1973 totaled $708.3
billion, constituting 40 per cent of all life insurance in effect in the
United States.142 Employers are able to secure insurance much more
inexpensively than could individual employees because of lower admin-
istrative expenses and a better risk selection process.'4
There has been no definitive administrative resolution of the inequali-
ties attendant group life insurance, nor has there been any significant
litigation raising this issue. Life insurance, if offered by the employer
as a benefit, clearly must be made equally available to employees of
both sexes;1'4 but again, as in annuities, sex-based mortality tables pro-
duce discriminatory results. The lower life expectancy of men means
that, for policies of equal value, men must pay higher premiums than
do women of the same age. The contribution made by an employer
under a group plan, though equal on a per capita basis, effectively
purchases more coverage for men than they could otherwise secure for
that amount, since they enjoy a portion of the advantage accorded
females under the present actuarial system.
The culprit, if there is one, seems to be the sex-based mortality table.
It has been suggested that this instrument be replaced by a unisex mor-
tality table which groups men and women together for purposes of
calculating mortality probability at various ages.14a Mandatory indus-
trywide use of such a table can be achieved only by federal legislation,
because use of the table by independent insurers would place such in-
surers at a competitive disadvantage in the pricing of insurance. Industry
spokesmen have criticized the idea of a unisex table as being likely to
produce inflexibility in insurance plans and to increase costs to all
purchasers of insurance. 146
Even a unisex table would not remove all sex-related risk considera-
tions. Prior to writing a large group plan, the insurance carrier looks
at an employer's past experience under its present policy, or under a
previous policy, to evaluate claims and other costs involving the policy.
OFCC interpretation which prohibits distinctions made on the basis of sex in employer
contributions "for insurance . . . and other similar 'fringe benefits.'"
142. See INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANcE, LIFE INStuRAN-CE FAcT BOOK 30 (1974).
143. For a more detailed explanation of group insurance, see D. BICKELHAUPT & J. MA-
GFE, GENERAL INSURANcE 673-92 (8th ed. 1970).
144. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b) (1975); Id. § 800.116(d); 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(c) (1974).
145. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REv.
624 (1973).
146. See OFCC Hearings, supra note 125, at 1-60.
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"This means that the premium costs for a particular risk are related to
the accumulated claims and expense results of that risk and that, with
favorable experience, dividends or premium rate reductions may be
earned." 14' This experience rating enables the insurer to maintain a
competitive rate. 148 Thus, an insurer who has underwritten a group life
plan with an employer of primarily female employees would adjust
the premium according to the mortality rate of that group. Though the
premium would not be computed expressly on the basis of the sexual
makeup of the group, it nonetheless would reflect the greater longevity
of the female employees. The same result is obtained in any type of
group plan where sex influences the claims experience. Thus the unisex
table cannot erase all distinctions based on sex in insurance coverage and
benefits.
Toward Uniformity in the Federal Standards
Although actions by congress, state and federal courts, and the exec-
utive branch have attempted to eradicate discrimination, failure to
uniformly apply the standards created by these bodies has resulted in
confusion and duplication of effort. As previously noted, the EEOC
guidelines conflict with those of the OFCC and Wage and Hour Divi-
sion with regard to the administration of life insurance and retirement
plans: the former demand equality of benefits, while the latter two
guidelines allow either equality of benefits or contributions. 14 9  A
similar dichotomy of standards has been illustrated with regard to the
omission of coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities in an employer's
group insurance plan.'5"
Since these varying and therefore confusing federal standards pro-
vide, each in its own area of proscription, for judicial and administrative
relief, the employer faces not only uncertainty as to the propriety of
his actions,' but also the possibility of incurring heavy losses for vio-
147. D. GREGG, GROUP LIFE INSURANCE 117 (1962).
148. See generally D. Cody & H. Boothroyd, Group Premiumns, Experience Rating and
Reserves, in THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LIFE UNDERWVRITERS, READINGS IN GROUP INSUR-
ANCE 810 (1973).
149. See notes 98, 99 and 137 supra & accompanying text.
150. See notes 98-123 supra & accompanying text.
151. Though the various sex discrimination statutes do not on their faces conflict,
and in fact attempt to foster inter-agency regulation, the agencies themselves have set
forth conflicting standards of permissible conduct. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)
(1975) with 41 C.F.R. § 60.20.3 (c) (1975).
On a practical level, it is possible for an employer charged with an equal pay viola-
tion in which he makes an out of court settlement to be charged again with a Title
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lation of any one standard.'52
Along with the dangers of facing a large award in a discrimination
suit, the employer further confronts the possibility that an agency or
court may increase payroll costs by adjusting the distribution of em-
ployee benefits to comport with the federal standard under review.
VII violation for the same employment practice. Interview with David Richeson,
practicing attorney, in Miami, Florida, December 6, 1974.
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that an employer may lawfully differentiate
between the pay of men and women "if such differentiation is authorized by the pro-
visions of section 206(d)" of the Equal Pay Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The
regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in-
terpreting Title VII, however, are less explicit. In explaining the relationship of Title VII
to the Equal Pay Act, the EEOC has said: "(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense
based on the Equal Pay Act way be raised in a proceeding under title VII. (c) Where
such a defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate consideration to the
interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor,
but will not be bound thereby." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1975) (emphasis supplied). Thus,
while the legislation itself establishes an absolute defense under the Equal Pay Act, the
regulations limit the effect of the Equal Pay Act depending on the discretion of the
EEOC and the courts.
Without making a specific reference to Title VII, the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of Labor does make some deference to other federal legislation. The
regulations state:
No provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act will excuse noncompliance
with any State or other law establishing equal pay standards higher than
the equal pay standards provided by section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act. On the other hand, compliance with other applicable legislation
will not excuse noncompliance with the equal pay provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
Id. at § 800.160. What a "higher equal pay standard" is, presents a difficult interpre-
tational problem. One case which indicated that this regulation will not be read
literally by the courts if the stricter standards of Title VII can be considered as a
"higher equal pay standard" is Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973), which illustrates the type of conflict
that exists between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. In Hodgson, an employer hired
only males to work in the men's clothing department and only females to work in the
women's department. The males received a greater salary due to the greater profit
margin and productivity of the men's department. The court upheld this practice under
the Equal Pay Act even though the men and women were performing "equal work."
Economic benefit to the employer was considered a factor, other than sex, which justi-
fied the pay differential. Id. at 597.
Title VII would bar the segregation of male and female workers into their respective
departments because customer preference clearly does not qualify as a bona fide occu-
pational qualification. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1) (iii) (1975). Further, economic
benefit to the employer would not justify differing wage rates unless each individual
employee was paid by commission based on the clothing which he sold. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1970).
152. See, e.g., EEOC v. A.T.&T., 8 E.P.D. f 9442. .Pursuant to a consent agreement
A.T.&T. must pay over $15 million to women and minorities who were denied equal
pay and promotional opportunities. Id.
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Faced with such potential liabilities, an employer may choose not to
finance those benefits which are accorded varying federal standards.
To alleviate the present confusion and move toward a uniform appli-
cation of federal standards, a closer liaison must be established between
the OFCC and EEOC.
Under the Executive Order, which in language and scope bears a
resemblance to Title VII, the OFCC refers individual grievances to the
EEOC.1" ' Therefore, the OFCC should consult and coordinate the
regulation of compliance standards with that body. At present, the
only established liaison is between the OFCC and the Wage and Hour
administrator regarding matters concurrently covered by the Executive
Order and the Equal Pay Act.15 4
Title VII, the most comprehensive legislation presently dealing with
sex discrimination, extends beyond the Equal Pay Act in requiring not
only equality of compensation, but also equality in all types of employer
activities that are actually or potentially discriminatory against women. 1 5
Unlike the equal protection clause or Executive Order 11246, Title VII
affects all employers having some effect upon interstate commerce,
limited only by the size of the employer's work force. 5 ' Increasing the
jurisdiction of Title VII, which may portend a wider application of the
strict "equal benefits" rule to employee benefits, has already been used
as a method of promoting uniformity in employment practices. 57
Moreover, increasing the jurisdiction of the EEOC, with a correspond-
ing decrease in the jurisdiction of other agencies, may be used for the
same purpose in the future.158
153. See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
154. 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.5 (c) (1974).
155. See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
156. See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
157. Federal employees were brought within Title VII coverage by the 1972 Amend-
ments, but administration of Title VII within the realm of governmental employment
was delegated to the Civil Service Commission. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 (a)-(b) (Supp.
II, 1972).
158. The Civil Service Commission has been criticized sharply in its performance of
anti-discrimination functions. Oversight Hearings on Unemployment and Discrimination
in Employment before the General Subconnnittee on Labor of the House Comnittee
on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Oversight
Hearings]. See id. at 50-64 (testimony of Joseph Connor, Regional Director of the
Civil Service Commission); id. at 157-59 (testimony of Donald Jones, President of
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1395). Despite significant in-
creases in the hiring of minorities and women, the absence of these groups in upper
level government positions has been noted as a failure of the Commission. See id. at
50-64 (testimony of Joseph Connor). The dual role of the Commission both as an
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Governance by the EEOC of all discriminatory action by employers
was indeed considered during the de~relopment of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act of 1972. The bill as it was approved by the House
provided that "a charge filed hereunder shall be the exclusive remedy
of any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment
practice of an employer, employment agency, or labor organization.""'
The Senate version expressly would have transferred Civil Service Com-
mission and OFCC anti-discrimination functions to the EEOC."'6 The
principal argument against conferring upon the EEOC the powers of
these other agencies turned upon its existing administrative backlog,
which was already causing significant delays in granting relief to ag-
grieved employees. Ultimately, sentiment favoring consolidation of
enforcement functions resulted in the EEOC being given authority to
bring court actions in discrimination cases, 1' jurisdiction to initiate pat-
terns and practice suits (transferred from the authority of the Attorney
employer and as the judge of whether discriminatory conduct has occurred within
federal agencies is likely to cause a transfer of the latter function to the EEOC.
The OFCC has also been criticized for failing to enforce its anti-discrimination guide-
lines. As stated by Representative Hawkins during the Oversight Hearings, "the law is
not being complied with by federal contractors, in spite of the new regulations in the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance. The guidelines have been strengthened to call
for contract termination when a Government contractor is found twice to be in vio-
lation . . . but we know the law is being violated. The Office of Federal Contract
Compliance knows that is not being upheld, and yet no sanctions are being invoked."
Id. at 31. This problem may be explained by a lack of staff members in the agency. In
1972, the total staff of the OFCC numbered 119 people. Id. at 24. Furthermore, in hear-
ings held by the OFCC to consider changing the current guidelines to require equality
of benefits in retirement plans, it was apparent that members of the panel considering the
change favored the EEOC approach. See OFCC Hearings, supra, note 125.
159. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1971). See Hearings on S. 2515, S. 2617
& H.R. 1746 Before the Subconm. on Labor of the Senate Conmm. on Labor & Public
Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
160. Section 11 of the Senate bill provided: "All functions of the Civil Service Com-
mission which the Director of the Office of Management and Budget determines relate
to nondiscrimination in Government employment are transferred to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission." S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1972).
Section 10 also provided: "All authority, functions, and responsibilities vested in the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Executive Order 11246 relating to nondiscrimination in
employment by Government contractors and subcontractors and nondiscrimination in
federally assisted construction contracts are transferred to the Equal Rights Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. . . ." Id. § 10.
Testimony given at the Senate hearings on the Title VII amendments generally
favored the proposed extension of EEOC power. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note
159 at 230, 269, 272-78.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. 11, 1972).
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General)162 and jurisdiction of actions brought against state and local
employers (formerly available only under the equal protection
clause) .163 Vigorous efforts by the OFCC and the Civil Service Com-
mission prevented the transfer of their anti-discrimination functions to
the EEOC.'64
Although the provisions eliminating the Civil Service Commission
and the OFCC from the anti-discrimination arena were defeated, the
final 1972 enactment amending Title VII established a multi-agency
council, the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council
(EEOCC), 16 which offers hope for a uniform federal policy in the
area of sex discrimination in the future. 6  Heads of the major federal
agencies charged with responsibility for enforcing anti-discrimination
laws are the members of this council. 67 The Council is designed to
promote agreements between the federal agencies which will "eliminate
conflict, competition, duplication and inconsistency among the opera-
dons, functions and jurisdictions of the various departments, agencies
and branches of the Federal Government . 6 While the Council
162. Id. § 2000e-6(c).
163. Id. S 20003-(f).
164. See Mitchell, An Advocate's View of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, 5
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHrs L. REv. 311, 317-18 (1973).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (Supp. II, 1972).
166. Id.
167. Members of the Council include the Secretary of Labor, Chairman of the EEOC,
Attorney General, Chairman of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, and Chairman of
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. Id.
168. Id. In its first report submitted to Congress and the President, the Equal Op-
portunity Coordinating Council described one of its major functions as:
[T]he design implementation of additional inter-agency agreements, policies
and practices, and the improvement of existing arrangements, for the pur-
pose of achieving improved effectiveness and efficiency in the operation of
Federal equal employment opportunity programs, and for the purpose of
unifying and simplifying to the extent possible the requirements placed on
those seeking to comply with the federal regulations.
Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, Report to Congress and the
President (June 25, 1972).
In the two succeeding years the Council has indicated that its major function has
been directed toward compiling a uniform set of guidelines to avoid the discriminatory
effect of tests. See Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, Report to
Congress and the President (June 29, 1973 and July 1, 1974). The most recent letter
indicated that the Council next would focus its efforts on conflicts among the federal
laws concerning reporting and record keeping. Id.
While its efforts thus far have been less than substantial, the Council may be the
body best able to unify the law of employee benefits by coordinating the substantive
provisions of the Executive Order, Equal Pay Act, and Title VII through development
of an all-inclusive and consistent set of guidelines.
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may fall short of the expectations, it clearly affords an opportunity for
the OFCC, the EEOC, and the Wage and Hour Division to cooperate
in formulating standards acceptable to all three agencies, consistent with
the broad standards of equality in the laws that these agencies are
designated to enforce.169 Furthermore, while an EEOCC standard
would not necessarily comport with the equal protection standard as
determined by the courts, it is likely that the administrative standard
would dominate the law of sex discrimination in the area of fringe bene-
fits, because in all likelihood, it would be less liberal than the constitu-
tional standard, thereby inducing plaintiffs to sue under the laws of
Congress rather than the Constitution."70
Conclusion
Employers and other affected parties are in need of clear and defini-
tive guidelines setting out the requirements necessary for fringe benefit
plans to conform to existing law on sex discrimination. In particular,
there is a need for a consistent policy regarding disability insurance cov-
erage of pregnancy, and for a resolution of the presently existing equal
benefits-equal contributions dichotomy in the treatment of pension
plans and life insurance. The substantive provisions in present laws
fail to provide specific guidelines, and the regulations of the various
enforcing agencies have added to the confusion. Only cooperation
among these agencies, guided by a coordinating council can resolve the
current uncertainty, and at present, the EEOCC appears to be the best-
equipped and most appropriate vehicle for achieving the goals of clarity
and uniformity of standards.
169. Another factor favoring the eventual predominance of the EEOC is the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) which, if ratified, will establish sex as a constitutionally
suspect standard. Since the 1972 passage of the ERA by Congress, 33 of the necessary
38 states have ratified it. Griffiths, ERA Projections, 60 Women Lawyers J. 16, 17
nn.1 & 2 (1974). Agencies, as well as courts, will be required to examine the results
of sex-based differentiations in employee benefit plans more carefully than before.
Further, actuarial classification by sex will be invalid, much as is classification by race
presently. This does not necessarily preclude premium adjustment based upon prior
claims experience, which may, in fact, reflect the sexual makeup of the work force
covered.
170. The 1972 amendments to Title VII bring federal employees within the ambit
of Title VII, thereby affording these persons an alternative means of redress preferable
to an equal protection action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. II, 1972). Only in the
exceptional case of a state-administered, employee-financed benefit plan will an indi-
vidual be forced to use solely the equal protection clause as a basis for relief.
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